Introduction: Background of the AU mission in Somalia, its mandate, achievements, and challenges.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a regional peacekeeping operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council in 2007 to support the Somali government in restoring peace and stability in the country. AMISOM’s mandate includes providing security for key institutions, facilitating humanitarian assistance, supporting the political process, and enabling the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces. AMISOM has contributed to the liberation of most of the territory from the control of al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group that has waged a violent insurgency against the Somali government and its allies. However, AMISOM has also faced many challenges, such as inadequate resources, logistical constraints, political divisions, human rights violations, and attacks from al-Shabaab and other armed groups. As of December 2023, AMISOM has about 19,000 troops and police personnel from six African countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia.
The transition plan and the timeline for the withdrawal of the AU peacekeepers in Somalia
The transition plan for the AU peacekeepers in Somalia was agreed upon by the Somali authorities, the AU, and the UN in 2017. It outlines the gradual handover of security responsibilities from the AU mission to the Somali security forces by the end of 2023. The plan is based on four main pillars: enhancing the operational readiness of the Somali forces, conducting joint operations against al-Shabaab, transferring AU bases to the Somali forces, and providing stabilization and recovery activities in liberated areas. The plan also identifies priority areas and sectors for the transition, such as Mogadishu, the main supply routes, and the maritime domain. The timeline for the withdrawal of the AU peacekeepers is divided into three phases. The first phase, which started in December 2020 and ended in June 2021, involved the reduction of 1,000 troops from the AU mission. The second phase, which is currently underway, involves the reduction of another 3,000 troops by the end of September 2023. The third and final phase, which was expected to start in October 2023 and end in December 2023, involves the complete withdrawal of the remaining 13,500 troops from the AU mission.
However, the third phase of the transition plan did not materialize as scheduled on grounds of several security factors of which The Federal Government of Somalia got compelled to ask the UNSC to delay the ongoing troop withdrawal from the country.
On 14 November 2024 African Union Peace and Security Council [AUPSC] met to consider the extension request and on 15 November 2023 The Security Council extended its authorization of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) until 30 June 2024 and renewed, until 1 December 2023, certain provisions of its sanctions regime relating to Al-Shabaab.
Is Somalia ready to take over security after the AU mission ends?
This is a complex and important question that does not have a simple answer. There are many factors that affect Somalia’s readiness to assume security responsibilities, such as the political situation, the reform and strengthening of the security forces, the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups, and the role and support of the international partners.
Somalia has made some progress in building and reforming its security sector, with the support of the AU, the UN, and other partners. It has agreed on a National Security Architecture and a Security Pact that outline the vision and the framework for the transition. It has also conducted an Operational Readiness Assessment of the Somali National Army and developed a Transition Plan that identifies the priority areas and sectors for the handover.
However, Somalia still faces many challenges and gaps in achieving full security ownership. The political situation remains fragile and contentious, with unresolved disputes between the federal government and the federal member states, and a controversial extension of the president’s mandate. The security forces are still in need of more training, equipment, funding, and coordination. The threat from al-Shabaab and other armed groups remains high and persistent, and the capacity of the Somali forces to counter them is limited. The support from the international partners is also uncertain and conditional, and may not be sufficient or sustainable.
Therefore, Somalia’s readiness to take over security after the AU mission ends depends on the implementation and the outcome of the Transition Plan, as well as the continued commitment and cooperation of all the stakeholders involved. The transition should be based on realistic and achievable benchmarks, and not on arbitrary deadlines. The transition should also be accompanied by political dialogue and reconciliation, civilian protection and human rights compliance, and stabilization and recovery activities. The transition should not compromise the security and stability of Somalia and the region, nor the gains and sacrifices made by the AU and other partners.
Main factors that affect Somalia’s readiness to assume security responsibilities, such as:
1. The political situation and the relations between the federal government and the federal member states: This factor is crucial for the success of the transition, as it affects the legitimacy, the unity, and the coordination of the Somali authorities. However, the political situation in Somalia is fragile and contentious, with unresolved disputes over the electoral process, the constitutional review, the power-sharing arrangements, and the resource allocation. These disputes have led to frequent clashes and stalemates between the federal government and the federal member states, undermining the trust and the cooperation among them. The political impasse also hampers the implementation of the Transition Plan, as it delays the formation of a representative and inclusive government, the establishment of a functional security sector, and the delivery of basic services to the population .
2. The reform and strengthening of the Somali security forces, including the army, the police, and the intelligence services: This factor is essential for the viability of the transition, as it determines the capability, the readiness, and the sustainability of the Somali forces. Somalia has made some progress in building and reforming its security sector, with the support of the AU, the UN, and other partners. It has agreed on a National Security Architecture and a Security Pact that outline the vision and the framework for the transition. It has also conducted an Operational Readiness Assessment of the Somali National Army and developed a Transition Plan that identifies the priority areas and sectors for the handover . However, Somalia still faces many challenges and gaps in achieving full security ownership. The security forces are still in need of more training, equipment, funding, and coordination. They also suffer from low morale, poor discipline, corruption, and human rights violations. The security forces are not representative of the diversity and the interests of the Somali people, and they lack the trust and the support of the local communities .
3. The threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups, and the capacity of the Somali forces to counter them: This factor is critical for the stability of the transition, as it affects the security and the peace of the country and the region. Al-Shabaab is a militant Islamist group that has waged a violent insurgency against the Somali government and its allies since 2006. It controls large parts of rural Somalia, and it conducts frequent attacks on urban areas, military bases, and civilian targets. It also imposes a harsh interpretation of Islamic law on the areas under its influence, and it exploits the grievances and the needs of the population to recruit and radicalize new members. Al-Shabaab is not the only armed group that poses a threat to Somalia. There are also clan militias, criminal gangs, and foreign fighters that operate in the country, and they often clash with each other and with the security forces. The capacity of the Somali forces to counter these threats is limited, as they lack the necessary resources, skills, intelligence, and coordination. They also face challenges in securing the liberated areas, preventing the resurgence of al-Shabaab, and protecting the civilians from violence and human rights abuses .
4. The role and support of the international partners, such as the UN, the EU, the US, and others: This factor is important for the effectiveness and the sustainability of the transition, as it affects the resources, the guidance, and the oversight of the process. The international partners have played a vital role in supporting the AU mission and the Somali government in their efforts to restore peace and stability in Somalia. They have provided financial, technical, logistical, and political assistance, as well as training, mentoring, and monitoring of the security forces. They have also facilitated the political dialogue and the reconciliation among the Somali stakeholders, and advocated for the respect of human rights and the rule of law. However, the support of the international partners is also uncertain and conditional, and may not be sufficient or sustainable. The international partners have different interests and agendas in Somalia, and they often compete or contradict with each other. They also have high expectations and demands from the Somali authorities, and they may impose sanctions or reduce their support if they are not satisfied with the progress or the performance of the transition .
Conclusion: In conclusion, Somalia’s readiness to take over security after the AU mission ends depends on the implementation and the outcome of the Transition Plan, as well as the continued commitment and cooperation of all the stakeholders involved. The transition should be based on realistic and achievable benchmarks, and not on arbitrary deadlines. The transition should also be accompanied by political dialogue and reconciliation, civilian protection and human rights compliance, and stabilization and recovery activities. The transition should not compromise the security and stability of Somalia and the region, nor the gains and sacrifices made by the AU and other partners. The transition is a historic opportunity and a daunting challenge for Somalia, and it requires the collective responsibility and the shared ownership of all the actors involved. The future of Somalia is in the hands of the Somali people, and they deserve the support and the solidarity of the international community .
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